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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS




                 Appellant
   v.
THE CAMELOT FOREST CONSERVATION ASSOCIATION, INC.,
A Pennsylvania Corporation; JERRY RIZZO, in his individual capacity and
in his official capacity as President of the Camelot Forest Conservation 
Association, Inc.; GERALD MAZUR, in his individual capacity and
in his official capacity as former President of the Camelot Forest Conservation
Association, Inc.; CAROL GREELEY, in her individual capacity and
in her official capacity as former Resident Manager for the Camelot Forest 
Conservation Association, Inc.; THE OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR
THE COUNTY OF MONROE; MARK PAZUHANICH, in his official capacity as
former District Attorney for the County of Monroe; LESLIE DUTCHCOT, in her
individual capacity and in her official capacity as Assistant District Attorney;
ROBERT J. SNELL, in his individual capacity and in his official capacity 
as a Stroud County Detective
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(M.D. Pa. Civ. No. 04-cv-00911)
District Judge: James M. Munley
_______________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
August 10, 2005
BEFORE: ROTH, McKEE and ALDISERT, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed : November 3, 2005)
2____________________




Edward J. Barr appeals the order of the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania granting the defendants’ motions to dismiss his civil rights
complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b).
The underlying facts are well-known to the parties and are fully set forth in the
District Court’s Memorandum Opinion.  We note only that Barr filed a complaint in the
District Court in April 2004, which was amended in June 2004.  Barr claimed that the
named members of the Camelot Forest Preservation Association (the “Camelot
defendants”) arbitrarily invoked an old deed restriction common to all properties in the
Camelot Forest development that prohibited the posting of “for sale” and/or “for rent”
signs on properties without written permission of the Association.  Barr continued to
place for sale signs on Camelot Forest properties despite written notice from the Camelot
defendants revoking their permission for him to do so.  He contends that the Camelot
Defendants stole and destroyed his for sale signs on at least eighty-eight separate
occasions since 1998.  Barr complained to the Pocono Mountain Regional Police
Department about the alleged criminal activity.  However, the police did not arrest or
charge anyone.  Barr then sought to lodge a private criminal complaint against the
  We disagree that Rooker-Feldman precludes this action.  The doctrine does not1
apply to federal actions that simply raise claims previously litigated in state court unless
the federal action invites the federal court to overturn the state court judgment.  See
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 125 S.Ct. 1517 (2005).  Although Barr’s
initial complaint appears to have presented such an invitation to the District Court, the
amended complaint does not.  Because it was not raised below, we decline to decide
whether res judicata would have precluded Barr’s federal claims.
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Camelot defendants that County Detective Snell and the Monroe County District
Attorneys (collectively the “County defendants”) refused to prosecute.  Barr alleged that
the Camelot defendants’ actions resulted in lost sales and business opportunities.  He
claimed that his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated; he sought
declaratory and injunctive relief under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242 and 245 and 42 U.S.C. §
1983.
The defendants filed separate Rule 12(b) motions to dismiss.  Both sets of
defendants claimed that Barr’s action was barred by the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine and by
the Younger abstention, and that Barr failed to state a constitutional claim.  The County
defendants also claimed prosecutorial immunity.  The District Court granted the dismissal
motions, holding that the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine precluded all of Barr’s claims except
the alleged violations of federal criminal statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242 and 245.   The1
District Court dismissed the federal criminal statute claims because §§ 241, 242, and 245
are criminal offenses for which there is no civil remedy, and therefore, Barr lacked
standing to bring them.  Barr filed a timely appeal.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and our review of the District
4Court’s order granting dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is plenary.  See Weston v.
Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420, 425 (3d Cir. 2001).  We accept as true all factual allegations
in the complaint and will affirm a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) only if it is certain that
no relief can be granted under any set of facts which could be proved.  Steamfitters Local
Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Phillip Morris Inc., et al., 171 F.3d 912, 919 (3  Cir.rd
1999).
After a careful and independent review of the record, we will affirm judgment on
the federal criminal statute claims as to all of the defendants for the reasons stated by the
District Court in its memorandum opinion.  As for the remaining claims, we will affirm
dismissal in the defendants’ favor on alternate grounds as further discussed below.  See
Univ. of Md. v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 923 F.2d 269, 275 (3d Cir. 1991).
The First Amendment prohibits governmental, not private, infringement of free
speech.  Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976).  Similarly, the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits the state, not private individuals, from depriving any person of a
constitutionally protected right.  Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).  Thus, as a
threshhold matter, in order to make out a constitutional claim under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, Barr must allege state action.  Likewise, under § 1983, Barr
must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of
state law, in addition to alleging a deprivation of a constitutionally protected right.  West
v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988); Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir.
51995).  Assuming all of Barr’s allegations to be true, as we must, we conclude that there
is no set of facts from which we can infer state action on the part of the Camelot
defendants.  Here, acting on their own, without any state involvement, the Camelot
defendants revoked their permission allowing Barr to place for sale signs on development
properties and engaged in private enforcement of the regulation.  Absent any state action,
the District Court properly dismissed the constitutional claims and § 1983 claims against
the Camelot defendants for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
As for the County defendants, Barr asserts that the former and current District
Attorneys for Monroe County wrongly refused to prosecute his private criminal complaint
against the Camelot defendants.  Assuming that Barr has alleged the violation of a
constitutionally protected right, prosecutorial immunity protects the District Attorneys
from interference with their ability to exercise independent judgment “when deciding
which suits to bring and in conducting them in court.”  Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,
424 (1976).  As for Detective Snell, Barr failed to state a claim of a deprivation of a
constitutional right against him for assisting the District Attorney in handling Barr’s
private complaint.  Finally, Barr’s suit against the Monroe County Office of District
Attorney fails because the amended complaint is completely devoid of any allegation that
an official policy, custom, or practice caused the alleged deprivation.  See Monell v.
Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment dismissing
all of Barr’s claims as to all defendants.
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